On the ‘Conflict’ of Plural Worldviews

“Whereas the beautiful is limited, the sublime is limitless, so that the mind in the presence of the sublime, attempting to imagine what it cannot, has pain in the failure but pleasure in contemplating the immensity of the attempt”

-- Immanuel Kant

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In this paper, I will defend that Kant’s theory of aesthetics illustrates a more advantageous baseline for defining political judgement in a democratic liberal society than Kant’s theory of morality. In his Third Critique, Kant's analysis of aesthetic and teleological judgement built the framework for what Arendt famously writes in a 1957 letter is “the political philosophy that Kant did not write.” Kant’s themes of independent judgement and enlarged thought bring forth a grounding for politically inventive discourse which is dependent on the rationality of its deliberators. What inconsistencies does our structure of democracy face when confined by a vivid restraint of what ought to be introduced to the political dialogue? If we adhere to the method of avoidance when engaging in public discourse, what dangers do we face of mitigating meaning and neutralizing our claims when making an appeal to political reformation? Rather than placing reliance on the efficacy of purely widespread notions, political speech ought to be shaped around the shared structure of human cognition, an understanding of rationality that is derived from the breakdown of consensus-based framework. I will critique John Rawls’ conception of inclusive public reason by outlining the difficulty in applying systems of neutrality and the needless consequences that public reason imposes on democracy.

Rawls’ design of public reason aims to bridge the gaps inevitable within a society containing widely variant perspectives. In order to substantiate these innumerable political judgements into what he believes can reach a functioning consensus, Rawls proposes a system of filtration with the intent to weed private matters out of political discourse which do not pertain to the unified whole. Cases offered to political discourse must foundationally be acceptable to the average, and this is believed to be better ensured by disentanglement of public and private matters. Rawls was later able to recognize the threat which this exclusive reasoning may pose regarding over-restrictiveness. Towards the end of this chapter of Political Liberalism, Rawls resolves to a more inclusive view of reasoning, offering that, because all reasons do have a personal weight, utilization of personal conviction is an acceptable force in drawing forth a judgement if and only if the doctrine fastened itself to a public reason in conclusion. The chapter closes with this settlement exactly, and that the duty to reasonably advance and advocate for such convictions fell on the shoulders of the citizens. By restricting justice as fairness within the political domain, Rawls seeks to uphold unity among the numerous reasonable yet incompatible views held by members of a pluralistic society.

While the idealist framework of a political sphere which encourages coexistence is an invaluable proposal to democracies, it is met with multiple procedural difficulties which defy the pluralism built into democratic groundwork. Critics of public reason point out the impossibility of ensuring that citizens cooperate according to the principle of legitimacy. It is undoubtedly challenging for both the public and the individual to determine if they are truly operating by way of decisions unburdened by one’s own beliefs, and there is no possible investigation to check that citizen’s pluralistic and strongly-held views have been sidestepped. Additionally, critics identify irresolution in designation of the bound of “public” and “private” within Rawls’ attempt at distinction, pointing out that not all political matters fall into one of the two leagues, and that members of a society are bound to categorize these matters non-unanimously. We often tend to misjudge or underestimate the political soul that a seemingly private matter can stir up, and while Rawls believes that public reason can mitigate this thing which he believes to be a miscalculation, he fails to establish the civil and political agents which will vindicate it. Regardless of procedural uncertainties, it is important to clarify that it is altogether a mistake to mischaracterize democracy as a system of government threatened by these inevitable “non-cooperations.” The pursuits of reform which Rawls attempts to solve are vital to the ambition of pluralistic democratic societies. Rather than treating reasonableness for citizens to uphold as a preventative measure, Kant’s theory of aesthetics offers the value in regulating the freedoms of public discourse from the opposite end in a world where civic deviation is impossible to treat.

Now that I have analyzed this first inconsistency with the ideal of public reason, I will provide that Kantian theory of judgment mitigates the procedural issues identified. While Rawls does provide a “duty of civility,” Kant’s emphasis on “indeterminate concepts” of judgement, individualism, and autonomy reallocates the civic roles which Rawls leaves in limbo. Similar to Rawls, Kant identifies a role within each member of a society to remove himself from the subjective of his personal tenets and reflect on part of the greater community, establishing this as the obligation of “enlarged thought.” However, authorizing independence differently from Rawls, Kant’s accompanying emphasis on individual reflection in the public sphere leads citizens to both a sense of autonomy in political judgement as well as a directive towards conclusive elements which will benefit the pluralistic and communicative political life of democracy. Kant’s greater focus on reflective judgement solves the uncertainty of responsibility to establish sensus communis by placing responsibility on the shoulders of the individual. Acceptance of this responsibility of rationality by citizens is made probable by offering a place for their comprehensive doctrines to exist in public discourse during the course of the search for universality, rather than only once it is found. By implementing Kant’s theory of judgement as a baseline for political reflection, individuals may bridge between the theoretical ideas derived from their personal comprehensive doctrines and the rational sense of freedom a democratic society aims to be emblematic of.

My following critique of public reason illustrates the limitations that it may inflict on the statements and claims of citizens and the consequent inhibitions that political modernization may face. Public reason is met with worry about a disregard of culture, and questions arise about situations in which marginalized communities face “private” adversities which call for policy reform although they may not affect the entire population. These points of controversy with Rawlsian public reason regard a fear of neutralization of the voices within a pluralistic society. If reasons which ultimately tie back to the communal directive are the only shouts ascribed value within the public sphere, reasons pertaining solely to minorities are lost in the choir of public deliberation. Furthermore, public reason leaves no room for newer, reformist ideas to be brought to the table of political discourse even if they have the potential to ignite universal benefit, simply because they presently have not yet done so. These sterilizations which public reason imposes undermine the democratic goal of multiplicity of voices within the public sphere and pose a threat to the functionality of a self-representative system of government.

This fear of indistinction is very real among members of a democratic society; modification driven by plurality is the very feature which democracy was built to achieve rather than an issue to be solved. Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgement welcomes the process of a public discourse which measures the reasonableness of claims after the diversity of judgements has been declared. Free play and imagination are features of pluralism to foster simply because their existences are inevitable. Arendt points out that creative contemplation must play a crucial role in the reflective process, and that “This operation of imagination prepares the object for ‘the operation of reflection.’ And this second operation…is the actual activity of judging something” (‘Twelfth Session,’ p. 68). Arendt believes that it is impossible to wipe this imaginative process, and that an attempt to do so installs a common interest that is far too narrow to accommodate. Kant sides with Arendt on the unattainability of this correction, stating that, in fact, “we do not simply ‘run over’ the objects of thought as they are supposed to stand in reality but rather add our affective reaction, which varies with our subjective natures” (Zerilli 46). Even if we did desire to scrub away the assortment of values which gives breath to our democratic system, there is no form of discourse wherein “the same object, presented to a mind totally different, can produce the same sentiment” (Zerilli 46), and this is due to our plurality alone. Thus, the consensus Rawls illustrates cannot exist as simply as he imagines. We stand no chance to strip the originative aspects from judgement given that the formulation of judgement is dependent on them, and, even if possible, doing so would deprive the public sphere of the heterogeneity essential to its operation. 

Kantian theory of judgement might face objections that giving such credit to imagination in the service of judgement may leave little room for criticism due to subjective foundations, or that it encourages an overly-generous venture within the “reasonable” scope. However, Kant is careful to specify that, while he believes in the priority of particulars, imagination as a “necessary ingredient of perception” holds only the power of preparation of those particulars for judgement. This imaginative aspect contains materials assembled under both the personal and the universal. This universal endpoint that finalizes the formulation of judgement is the point at which Kant intends that unreasonable judgements be criticized, reframed, or ridiculed. Additionally, not only is this a misunderstanding of the autonomous advocate of political judgement, but it slights the ways in which personal and imaginative aspects already play a meaningful role in democracy. Even in cases of judgements made purely through public reasons, examples and proofs are vital to the appeals made in discourse, and where do these samples come from but from the free inventiveness of the mind? Although Rawls attempts to repress the necessity of this introspection in public discourse, from where do you find the perspectives of others which resonate and reverberate in your mind during political deliberation? As it is, our political discourse is busy with personal manifestations of things which are not present or immediately apparent, yet Rawls is working to temper a feature of democracy which is already in flight. I argue that it is altogether far too late.  

The notion of public reason suffers from these three major flaws which affirm its principles to be either impossible or inessential to democracies. Public reason poses severe uncertainties in the designation of roles which would grant functionality. Additionally, public reason creates fierce restraint on the expressions of citizens and the possibility for reform. If Rawls views the need for public reason as a response to “the deadly conflict of plural worldviews,” he is really believing the deadly conflict to be rooted in the democratic system itself. Allows us to critique the existing form of government in a way that is unmitigated, honest. Although Rawls' intent to promote synchronization in a multifaceted society is a worthwhile and well-intended pursuit, it is not worth abandonment of the democratic tenet of adaptability in order to do so, and for navigating plurality this creates more of a conflict than a solution. Plurality is not a creature in need of management, but amplification. A world of differences is not a unified world lost, but many worlds gained.